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1ABSTRACT:
This essay will explore the intersection between the FDA's regulation of imported foods and the United
States' obligations under the General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT) the Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
Agreement), three of the foundational documents underlying the WTO system. I will argue that the FDA's
import regime violates US trade obligations both by virtue of its use of a dierent standard for denying
imported food access to the US market than for determining whether domestically produced food is t for
consumption and by virtue of the relatively informal manner in which FDA is able to exercise virtually
limitless statutory authority over imported foods. Additionally, the essentially ad hoc determination of
what imported food is inspected or detained, while not necessarily inconsistent with the WTO regime, is
susceptible to abuses that could give rise to trade complaints.
As a result of improved transportation technology and reduced trade barriers, the United States today
imports an unprecedented amount of food from the rest of the world. Yet the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, the body charged with ensuring the safety and suitability of that food for American consumers, is
ill equipped to fulll that mandate. While the amount of FDA-regulated food imported into the United
States has increased substantially over the past decade, the resources that FDA has available to monitor
food imports have largely remained constant. Perhaps more importantly, the FDA continues to rely on an
import regulation scheme that is both inadequate to ensure the safety of food reaching the American people
and at the same time arguably inconsistent with US obligations under the World Trade Organization.
This essay will explore the intersection between the FDA's regulation of imported foods and the United
States' obligations under the General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT) the Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
Agreement), three of the foundational documents underlying the WTO system. I will argue that the FDA's
import regime violates US trade obligations both by virtue of its use of a dierent standard for denying
imported food access to the US market than for determining whether domestically produced food is t for
consumption and by virtue of the relatively informal manner in which FDA is able to exercise virtually
limitless statutory authority over imported foods. Additionally, the essentially ad hoc determination of what
2imported food is inspected or detained, while not necessarily inconsistent with the WTO regime, is suscep-
tible to abuses that could give rise to trade complaints. Nonetheless, in this area of regulation, US interests
in promoting free trade should not take precedence over public health. The FDA should take steps pursuant
to the SPS Agreement to negotiate agreements recognizing the equivalence of foreign food safety regimes,
as such agreements reduce barriers to trade while at the same time conserving FDA resources. In many
cases, however, such agreements will simply not be appropriate, because the foreign regulatory authority in
question is simply unable to ensure an adequate level of food safety. In such cases, FDA has little choice but
to rely on its current regime of targeted inspections and import alerts. In order to ensure that this system is
as eective as possible, the FDA needs to treat imported food dierently from its domestic equivalent, even
if such dierential treatment is a violation of US treaty obligations.
I. An Explosion in Food Imports
FDA-regulated food products make up a large percentage of the foreign trade of the United States. A recent
study found that one quarter of products entering the United States were FDA-regulated food products. This
amounts to nearly 2.25 million imported products.1 Over the last decade, the amount of food imported by
the United States has increased dramatically. In terms of food regulated by the FDA alone, the approximate
value of food imported has nearly doubled, from $23 billion in 1991 to $41.2 billion in 2000.2 The largest
1Linda R. Horton, \Food From Developing Countries: Steps to Improve Compliance," 53 Food Drug L.J. 139, 140-1 (1998).
2Source: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc mrkti/tdst/engdoc/tr homep.html. (visited 2/29/02). Dollar gures are in cur-
rent year dollars. These numbers are by necessity approximate. FDA does not regulate all food imported into the United
States. The United States Department of Agriculture regulates imports of meat and poultry. The trade statistics used here
divide imports into categories that do not necessarily track this regulatory dierence. The categories of goods included in this
gure are:
1. Cereals
2. Products of the Milling Industry; Malt, Starches, Inulin and Wheat Gluten
3. Fats, Oils, Their Cleavage Products and Waxes
4. Meat, Fish and Seafood Preparations
5. Sugars and Sugar Confectionery
6. Cocoa and Cocoa Preparations
7. Preparations of Cereals, Flour, Starch or Milk (Including Bread and Pastry)
3categories of imported food by value in 2000 were \Beverages, Spirits, and Vinegar," and \Fish, Crustaceans,
Molluscs, and Other Aquatic Invertebrates," each of which accounted for over $8 billion in imports. Also
of note is the rapid growth in imports of prepared foods.3 This is particularly important to the FDA
because such foods typically are intended for sale directly to US consumers, without any further processing
in the US that can serve as an intervention point for regulators.4 Food is imported from over one hundred
dierent countries.5 The ten largest exporters of food to the US by value are, in descending order: Canada,
Mexico, Thailand, France, Italy, Chile, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Brazil, and the People's Republic
of China.6 It is striking that half of these are developing states. In fact, over 40% of US food imports come
from the developing world.7 These imports are of special concern to the FDA because food producers in
developing countries often have diculty in assuring adequate sanitation. Such countries may also be more
vulnerable to outbreaks of pests or disease that might aect food safety.8
As seems typical with the FDA, the increasing scope of the agency's duties has not been matched by a
8. Preparations of Vegetables, Fruit, Nuts or Other Parts of Plants
9. Miscellaneous Edible Preparations
Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar
10. Fish, Crustaceans, Molluscs and Other Aquatic Invertebrates
11. Dairy Produce, Eggs, Honey and Other Similar Edible Products of
Animal Origin
12. Edible Vegetables and Certain Roots and Tubers
13. Edible Fruits and Nuts
14. Coee, Tea, Mat e and Spices
3Id.
4See Horton, supra n. 1 at 140. See also trade statistics available at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc mrkti/tdst/engdoc/tr homep.html.
5Source: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc mrkti/tdst/engdoc/tr homep.html.
6Source: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc mrkti/tdst/engdoc/tr homep.html. These ten countries accounted for approxi-
mately 60% of all imported food in 2000. Canada and Mexico accounted for half of this amount.
7Source: http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc mrkti/tdst/engdoc/tr homep.html. For lack of a better method, states
are classied as \developing" if they are not members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD). The OECD is the \international organization of the industrialized, market-economy countries." See
http://www.oecdwash.org/ABOUT/aboutmain.htm. (visited 3/1/02).
8Horton, supra n.1 at 155-157. In fact, the rising amount of imported food has coincided with an increase in the incidence
of diseases caused by food-born pathogens. See James R. Burke, \Comment: Warning: The Imported Food You are About to
Consume May (Or May Not) Be Harmful to Your Health." 15 J. Contemp H. L. & Pol'y 183, 183 (1998).
4concurrent increase in agency resources. Although The Clinton Administration's Food Safety Initiative9 did
result in some increased funding for import inspection activities, FDA remains unable to inspect more than
a small portion of imported food products.10 The increased availability of imported food is potentially a
tremendous boon to American consumers. If, however, the safety of this food cannot be guaranteed, those
benets may be overshadowed. It is thus essential for the FDA to nd a way to deal with vastly increased
quantities of imports without imposing undue burdens on those imports reaching the market.
II. Existing FDA Regulation of Food Imports
FDA's current import regime, however, was largely developed in a time where food imports were much less
prevalent than they are today. It is uncertain whether it will prove up to the challenge of ensuring the safety
of imported food in this age of easy transportation and low trade barriers. The statutory basis for FDA
regulation of imported food is Section 801 of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.11 The relevant portions of
the statute are as follows:
The Secretary of the Treasury shall deliver to the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
upon his request, samples of food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics which are being imported
or oered for import into the United States, giving notice thereof to the owner or consignee,
who may appear before the Secretary of Health and Human Services and have the right to
introduce testimony [...] If it appears from the examination of such samples or otherwise
that (1) such article has been manufactured, processed, or packed under insanitary condi-
tions or, [...] (2) such article is forbidden or restricted in sale in the country in which it
was produced or from which it was exported, or (3) such article is adulterated, misbranded,
[...], then such article shall be refused admission, except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section. The Secretary of the Treasury shall cause the destruction of any such article
refused admission unless such article is exported, under regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, within ninety days of the date of notice of such refusal or within such
additional time as may be permitted pursuant to such regulations.12
9See http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/dms/fsibroch.html (visited 2/28/02).
10See Burke, supra n. 8 at 192-194.
1121 U.S.C. x381
5The key element of the statutory language is the phrase \If it appears from the examination of such samples
or otherwise." This allows FDA to treat imported food in a fundamentally dierent way from its domestically
produced equivalent. The FDCA prohibits the introduction of domestically produced food into interstate
commerce only where such food is actually adulterated or misbranded.13 For imported food, the \mere
appearance of adulteration is enough to compel refusal to admit."14 There is no requirement that the food
be actually adulterated, or that the FDA nd as a fact that it is.15 In practice, the main eect of this dier-
ential treatment seems to be twofold. The dierent substantive standard allows FDA to prevent shipments
of imported goods from entering the stream of commerce based either on the results of testing of a small
sample of the shipment, or on general information about the importer or the country of origin. The statute
also aords considerably fewer procedural protections to importers, whose products may be detained by
FDA without a judicial condemnation proceeding.16 U.S. courts have not been troubled by this dierential
treatment.17 Typically this dierential treatment is justied by practical necessity, namely the inability of
FDA to eectively inspect foreign processing facilities.18 It should be noted that the court decisions blithely
upholding this dierential treatment all occurred prior to the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization.19 Despite the fact that the FDA's dierential treatment of imported foods may
violate US obligations to the WTO,20 US courts are not permitted to strike down or alter their construction
of statutes so as to render them consistent with the WTO treaties.21 Thus unless Congress decides to amend
1321 U.S.C. x342 (adulterated food); 21 U.S.C. x343 (misbranded food). See Sugarman v. Forbragd 267 F.Supp. 817, 823
(N.D.Cal.1967) (\Thus a food of domestic origin which is adulterated is subject to seizure and condemnation through the judicial
process; the owner is entitled to a jury trial; and the Government must prove that the food is in fact adulterated.")(emphasis
in original).
14Sugarman 267 F.Supp. at 824.
15Id. at 824.
16Sugarman 267 F. Supp at 824.
17See Continental Seafoods, Inc. v. Scwheiker 674 F.2d 38, n.10 (D.C.Cir.1982) (Noting FDA's \long established authority
to treat imported goods dierently from domestic ones").
18Id. at n. 10.
19Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994. http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/final e.htm#wtoagreement
(visited 3/2).
20See Part III, infra.
21The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. x3501 et seq.) expressly provides that \[n]o provision of any of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law
6the FDCA, FDA will retain broad statutory authorization to exercise essentially plenary power over imports.
FDA's broad statutory authority, however, is cabined in two important respects. First, the agency's persis-
tent lack of adequate resources practically limits its monitoring of food imports. Second, FDA has established
procedures under which it exercises the broad power and discretion granted it by Congress. This combina-
tion of practical and self-imposed limitations means that, despite FDA's broad powers, it's actual ability
to monitor imported food is quite modest. When an imported food product enters the United States, the
importer or its agent is required to le entry documents with the U.S. Customs service.22 Customs ags
imported articles subject to FDA regulation in order to bring them to FDA's attention.23 For such articles,
the importer is required to provide additional information, including an FDA product code, manufacturer
identication codes for the foreign manufacturers and shippers, and the actual country of origin, which may
dier from the country of origin for customs purposes.24 The customs documents are then screened electron-
ically by FDA's Operational and Administrative System for Import Support (OASIS) or manually by FDA
employees.25 At that point, FDA can take a number of actions. In most cases, the FDA takes no action, and
issues a \May Proceed Notice" to Customs.26 At that point, the product is released for entry into commerce
in the United States. Permitting a product's importation does not preclude FDA from taking action with
respect to the product in the future.27
of the United States will have eect." 19 U.S.C. x3512(a)(1). Also, the entry of the United States into the WTO did not serve
to \amend or modify any law of the United States, including any law relating to [...] the protection of human, animal, or plant
life or health." 19 U.S.C. x3512(a)(2)(A)(i).
22FDA Import Procedures, http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/import.txt (visited 2/26/02). These documents, which now
are led and processed electronically via Customs' Automated Commercial System, include a variety of information, including
the product's \entry number, entry date, importer identication, port of entry, vessel/voyage information, ler identication,
Harmonized Tari Schedule (HTS) code(s) for product described in importing documents (tari code), information on foreign
shipper, country of origin, quantity, and value." FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9 Subchapter Import Procedures.
(revised May 12,1998) http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9imp.html (visited 2/26/02).
23FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9, Subchapter Import Procedures. (revised May 12,1998)
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9imp.html (visited 2/26/02).
24Id.
25Id. For a description of the technical specications of OASIS, see http://www.fda.gov/ora/import/oasis/home page.html
(visited 3/05/02).
26FDA Import Procedures, http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/import.txt (visited 2/26/02).
27FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9 Subchapter Import Procedures. (revised May 12,1998)
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9imp.html (visited 2/26/02).
7In other cases, FDA may require examination of a sample before admitting a product shipment. The decision
to collect and examine a sample is based on:
1.
The nature of the product
2. FDA priorities, and
3. Past history of the commodity28
If FDA decides to collect a sample, the owner or consignee of the shipment is given notice of the sampling
and is required to hold the product pending the outcome of laboratory analysis.29 Based on this testing,
FDA will either determine that the product is in compliance with FDA regulations and permit its entry, or
determine that it appears to be adulterated, misbranded, or otherwise in violation of the FDCA.30 Should
FDA determine the latter, a Notice of Detention and Hearing is issued to the importer.31 The Notice is
required to contain a suciently detailed description of the alleged violation(s) for the importer to understand
and reply to the allegations.32
Upon receipt of the Notice of Detention and Hearing, the importer has ten working days to respond to
FDA's allegation. The importer is entitled to an informal hearing before FDA, and has the right to introduce
evidence and written or oral testimony as to the admissibility of the shipment.33 The importer may also seek
28FDA Import Procedures, http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/import.txt (visited 2/26/02).
29FDA Oce of Regulatory Aairs Import Program System Information, http://www.fda.gov/ora/import/ora import system.html
(visited 2/26/02).
30FDA Import Procedures, http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/import.txt (visited 2/26/02).
3121 C.F.R. 1.94.
32FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9 Subchapter Detention and Hearing. (revised May 12,1998)
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9det.html (visited 2/26/02).
33FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9 Subchapter Import Procedures. (revised May 12,1998)
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9imp.html (visited 2/26/02).
8to demonstrate that the product can be brought into compliance with FDA requirements, typically through
re-labeling. This hearing \is the importer's only opportunity to present a defense of the importation and/or
to present evidence as to how the shipment may be made eligible for entry."34 Following the hearing the
FDA will either determine the shipment to be in compliance with the FDCA and permit it to be imported,
determine that it is not in compliance, but authorize the importer to attempt to bring it into compliance,
or determine that it is irredeemably non-compliant, and refuse its admission. Articles that are refused
admission must be exported under FDA supervision within 90 days or destroyed.35 FDA's determination
of the admissibility of imports is not subject to judicial review, as it is \committed to agency discretion by
law."36 Thus judicial review is precluded by the Administrative Procedures Act.37
There is one additional action that FDA may take with regard to imported food. The FDCA authorizes FDA
to refuse admission to imported products if \it appears from the examination of [...] samples or otherwise"
that the product is in violation of the Act.38 In certain circumstances, FDA has interpreted that language to
allow it to detain certain products without physical examination (DWPE).39 Typically, DWPE of shipments
from a particular importer or country is appropriate where \there exists a history of the importation of
violative products, or products that may appear violative, or when other information indicates that future
entries may appear violative."40 The FDA Regulatory Procedures Manual oers detailed guidance on the
specic circumstances under which DWPE is appropriate.41 Any regional FDA oce may recommend
34FDA Import Procedures, http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/lrd/import.txt (visited 2/26/02).
35FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9 Subchapter Detention and Hearing. (revised May 12,1998)
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9det.html (visited 2/26/02).
36Sugarman, 267 F.Supp at 823.
375 U.S.C. x701(a)(2).
3821 U.S.C. x381(a). (emphasis added).
39This process was formerly known as \automatic detention."
40FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9 Subchapter Automatic Detention. (revised May 12,1998)
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9auto.html (visited 2/26/02). Generally this will be because of a
pattern of past violations, the result of an on-site inspection in a foreign country, or because of environmental factors calling
into question the safety of food from a particular area.
41See id, particularly the Sections entitled \Recommendations Based on One Violative Sample," \Recommendations Based
on Information and Historical Date," \Recommendation Based on Multiple Samples," \Automatic Detention of Importers'
Entries," and \Recommendations Based on Establishment Inspection."
9DWPE, although the nal decision on the issue rests with the FDA Division of Import Operations and
Policy (DIOP).42 Where it determines that DWPE is called for, DIOP will issue an Import Alert directing
regional FDA oces to detain the product in question.43
The adequacy of the procedure by which FDA issues an Import Alert has been questioned in a number of
court decisions. In Bellarmo v. Klug, 678 F.Supp. 410 (E.D.N.Y.1988), a Federal District court invalidated
an Import Alert, holding that FDA Import Alerts instructing eld operatives to automatically detain certain
products were \legislative rules."44 As a result, the FDA is required to conduct informal rulemaking proce-
dures set out in the Administrative Procedure Act45 prior to the issuance of such an alert.46 The Bellarno
Court invalidated the import alert because of FDA's failure to follow the required procedures.47 Several other
courts have similarly found problems with FDA's issuance of import alerts.48 FDA, however, continues to
take the position that it need not conduct a rule-making procedure prior to placing a product on automatic
detention.49 FDA does, however, give importers the opportunity to present evidence to prove that their
products should no longer be detained without examination. The standards for removing a manufacturer,
product, or shipper from automatic detention are quite high, however.50
42FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9 Subchapter Automatic Detention. (revised May 12,1998)
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9auto.html (visited 2/26/02).
43FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9 Subchapter Import Information Directives. (revised May 12,1998)
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9dirs.html (visited 2/26/02).
44Bellarno, 678 F.Supp. at 416.
455 U.S.C.x553. The APA requires agencies to give adequate notice of proposed rules, and give interested parties an oppor-
tunity to comment.
46Bellarno, 678 F.Supp. at 412.
47Id. at 416.
48See Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, eds., Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials (2d. ed. 1991) 1087. All of
these cases were decided at the District Court level.
49FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9 Subchapter Import Information Directives. (revised May 12,1998)
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9dirs.html (visited 2/26/02).
50FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9 Subchapter Automatic Detention. (revised May 12,1998)
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9auto.html (visited 2/26/02). For example, an importer who has
a single product on automatic detention, and who is a rst time violator, must provide evidence that its last ve commercial
shipments have been in full compliance with the FDCA.
10III. The WTO Framework
A. General Overview
The FDA's system for dealing with imports evolved in a radically dierent world than the one we live
in today. Until the birth of the World Trade Organization, the international trade system was largely
unconcerned with measures that countries took to protect the health of their citizens, including food safety
laws.51 The WTO changed all this. The member states of the WTO committed themselves not only to an
unprecedented reduction in traditional trade barriers such as taris and quotas, but also to eliminating trade
barriers that might result from domestic regulation. Subject to limited exceptions, member-states agreed
to regulate imported products in the same manner as like domestic products.52 In the area of food safety,
in particular, it was feared that measures with a disguised protectionist purpose might become increasingly
popular. Agricultural products traditionally have been the beneciaries of taris and quotas, and as those
protections diminished in the new trade regime, it was feared that agricultural interests, particularly in
the richer developed countries, would seek to impose stringent food safety requirements that exporters
might not be able to meet.53 The result of these fears was the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, probably the most ambitious and revolutionary multilateral trade agreement to date. In addition
to incorporating the non-discrimination principle that is at the heart of the global trading system, the SPS
Agreement also binds states to base non-discriminatory public health measures on sound science. The SPS
agreement is thus potentially the primary international constraint on the FDA's regulation of food.54 FDA
51Hutt & Merrill, supra n. 48 at 1088.
52General Agreement on Taris and Trade III:4, October 13, 1947. [GATT].
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/final e.htm (visited 2/26/02).
53See Understanding the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/sps e/spsund e.htm
(visited 2/26/02). An example of this is the EU's ban on the import of beef containing certain hormones typically used to
promote growth in cattle, despite the fact that there is no evidence that those hormones constitute a health risk. Oddly
enough, those hormones are widely used in beef production outside of Europe, but not be European cattle farmers. The WTO
Appellate Body has found the EU ban to be in violation of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. See
generally EU-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products AB-1997-4. Report of the Appellate Body (1997).
54As yet, no FDA regulation has been challenged as violating either the SPS Agreement, TBT Agreement, or GATT. European
trade ocials, however, have asserted that FDA's nutrition labeling requirements are an illegal trade barrier. See Bruce A.
11regulations relating to economic adulteration of food and nutrition labeling may additionally be within
the ambit of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which requires that such regulations be non-
discriminatory and no more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve their desired end. 55 The nal major
change made by the WTO regime was in the area of dispute resolution. Under the old trade regime, the
General Agreement on Taris and Trade, disputes could be referred to panels of experts for adjudication,
but the panel's decision was only binding if it was adopted by a unanimous vote of all signatories, including
the state that lost the panel decision.56 Under the WTO, the outcome of the dispute resolution process has
become binding on the states, except where the member states unanimously reject a decision.57
B. GATT
The General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT) is the cornerstone of the WTO regime. At its heart
are two fundamental principles: Most-favored Nation status (MFN) and National Treatment (NT). The
MFN principle is codied in Article I, paragraph 1 of the GATT, which states:
Silverglade, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Weakening Food Safety Regulations to Facilitate
Trade? 55 Food Drug L.J. 517, 520 (2000). One commentator has also suggested that the Food Quality Protection Act of
1996 might violate the SPS agreement. See Edward M. McDonald, The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996: By Removing
Chemical Irritants from Our Environment Will It Generate Trade Irritants to Replace Them? 25 Wm. & Mary L. & Pol'y
Rev. 749 (2001).
55Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, April 15, 1994. [TBT]. http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/final e.htm
(visited 2/26/02).
56See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 Minn. J.
Global Trade 1, 9 (1999).
57Understanding On the Rules and Procedures Governing Disputes 17:4, April 15, 1994.
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/final e.htm (visited 2/26/02).
12With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports
or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and
with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III58, any advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in
or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.59
With respect to FDA regulation of food imports, this provision requires FDA not to unjustiably discriminate
among like products based solely on their country of origin. Such discrimination does not seem particularly
likely, but given the limited ability of FDA to actually inspect imports, and the essentially ad hoc way
in which FDA determines which shipments to inspect, it is conceivable that some pattern of discrimination
might emerge that would be actionable under this portion of the treaty. Such discrimination, however, would
more than likely be justied under Article XX of the GATT.60
Potentially more troublesome for FDA, however, is the national treatment requirement. Article III, para-
graph 4 of the GATT states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements aecting
their internal sale, oering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.61
FDA regulation of imports would seem to squarely violate this provision. FDA applies a dierent substantive
standard to imported and domestic foods, and additionally provides fewer procedural safeguards when taking
action against imported rather than domestic foods.62 Thus, for example, a head of lettuce from Chile and
one grown in California are regulated quite dierently. This is prima facie illegal under Article III.
60See discussion of Art. XX, infra.
62See Part II., supra.
13A number of important states have argued that Article III of the GATT should be read to incorporate an
\aims and eects" test, which would only invalidate domestic taxes and regulations where they are found to
have a disguised protectionist purpose.63 Regulations that are legitimately intended to, for example, ensure
food safety would thus not violate Art. III:4, even if they incidentally resulted in dierential treatment
between domestic and imported products. Put another way, this test would permit states to dene \like"
products in terms other than physical characteristics or consumer end-use. If, for example, Chilean lettuce
contained potentially dangerous pesticide residues not present in Californian lettuce, it would be permissible
for the United States to regulate Chilean and Californian lettuce dierently|the dierent pesticide residues
would cause the two types of lettuce not to be like products. The WTO Appellate Body64 has atly rejected
this reasoning, holding that like products are to be dened in terms of consumer end-use alone.65 Regardless
of the purpose of a particular regulation, if it treats similar imported and domestic products dierently, it
is in violation of Art. III: 4 of the GATT.
Even if a regulatory measure violates Art. III:4, it may nonetheless be permissible under the GATT. The
GATT recognizes that states have many legitimate regulatory goals that may require deviation from strict
observance of the national treatment or MFN principles. Thus Article XX of GATT provides for a series of
ten exceptions to those principles. The relevant text is:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting
party of measures:
[...]
63See Japan { Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1996-2, 1996 WTO DS LEXIS 5 (1996) (argument made by Japan), European
Communities { Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, AB-1997-3, 1997 WTO DS LEXIS 10 (1996)
(argument made by EC).
64The Appellate Body is a permanent adjudicatory body with appellate jurisdiction over trade disputes brought under the
WTO agreements. Disputes are brought in the rst instance before ad hoc panels of experts in international trade law.
65Japan { Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1996-2, 1996 WTO DS LEXIS 5, *62-66. (1996).
14(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;
[...]
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including
those relating to [...]the prevention of deceptive practices;66
Analysis under Article XX is bifurcated. The WTO Panel must rst determine whether the measure at
issue falls within one of the enumerated exceptions. If it does, the Panel must go on to determine whether
the measure is consistent with the Article's chapeau, that is, whether it constitutes either arbitrary or
unjustiable discrimination, or a disguised restriction on international trade.67
If the FDA's import regime were challenged as violative of Art. III:4 of GATT, the United States would
likely have to concede a prima facie violation, and argue that the import regime is justiable under the
provisions of Art. XX. With respect to Article XX(b), the United States would argue that, because of it's
inability to conduct adequate on-site inspections in foreign countries, it needs to apply a lower threshold
of violation on imported foods in order to ensure the safety of imported foods. Of course, this justication
would only apply to the FDA regulation of imports to ensure compliance with FDA regulations relating to
food safety. FDA regulation of imports to enforce federal law relating to economic adulteration, misbranding,
and other non-health related areas would have to fall under the catch-all provision of Article XX(d). The US
argument under Article XX(d) would be that the FDCA is a law not inconsistent with the other provisions
of the WTO, and that FDA's inability to conduct on-site inspections abroad makes dierential treatment of
imported goods necessary to secure compliance with all of the provisions of the FDCA.
In both cases, the success or failure of the US argument would turn on the meaning of the word \necessary."
The WTO Appellate Body has articulated the standard for necessity in the context of Article XX(b) as
follows:
67United States { Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, AB 1996-1, 1996 WTO DS LEXIS 1, *46 (1996).
15[I]mport restrictions [...] could be considered to be necessary in terms of Article XX(b)
only if there were no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less
inconsistent with it, which [the member state] could reasonably be expected to employ to
achieve its health policy objectives.68
The issue of whether an alternative measure would in fact be reasonably available is decided on a case-by-
case basis, and involves balancing a number of factors.69 In cases involving Article XX(b), the determinative
factor will often be the importance of the value that is protected by the measure. Because the protection of
human life and health is both \vital and important to the highest degree," it is easier for a WTO panel to
\accept as necessary measures designed to achieve [that] end."70 Unless the complaining state can propose a
measure that would clearly provide the same level of overall health protection, and at the same time be less
inconsistent with the GATT, a WTO panel is likely to uphold the measure as justied under XX(b). The
FDA import regime seems likely to pass muster under this standard. Although the present FDA system is
imperfect at best, any move to treat imported foods more like domestic foods would likely diminish FDA's
ability to prevent unsafe imported food from reaching the American consumer.
The Appellate Body's treatment of necessity under Article XX(d) closely mirrors its Article XX(b) analysis.
The key question remains whether there is an alternative measure reasonably available to the state that would
be less inconsistent with the GATT than the measure it is seeking to justify.71 This requires a case-by-case
balancing approach, with three main factors to consider:
[the] contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regu-
lation at issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or
regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.72
Article XX(d) covers measures designed to achieve a wide variety of goals, so the relative importance of
each of these factors may vary according to the measure at issue. In the case of the FDA import regime,
69Id. at *155.
70Id. at 156.
71Korea { Measures Aecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef, AB-2000-8, 2000 WTO-DS-LEXIS 36, *118 (2000).
16these factors would again seem to weigh in favor of justication. The FDCA clearly protects very important
interests and values. Even if the economic and consumer interests protected by the FDCA are considered less
important than the health and safety interests, the FDA's monitoring of imports necessarily must consider
both of these aspects. It would be an administrative nightmare for the FDA to have to deal with two
separate import regimes, one for dealing with potentially unsafe food, and one for dealing with all other
violations of the FDCA. Because of the diculty of disaggregating the two aspects of FDA enforcement, and
the paramount importance of FDA's safety mission, to the extent that the FDA import regime is necessary
in the sense required by Article XX(b), it would also have to be necessary under Article XX(d). The one
possible exception to this might be in the area of automatic detention. This draconian sanction could be
seen by a WTO panel as a disproportionately trade restrictive response if it were widely used for reasons
other than the protection of consumer health. FDA's internal policy with regard to automatic detention,
however, seems to limit its use to cases of suspected food safety problems, so this issue is unlikely to arise.73
Even where a WTO panel nds a measure to be justied under one of the enumerated exceptions in Article
XX, that measure may still violate the GATT if it does not conform to the additional requirement of the
chapeau of Article XX that \such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade."74 The Appellate Body treated the chapeau as containing three distinct
prohibitions: against arbitrary discrimination, against unjustiable discrimination, and against disguised
restrictions on international trade.75 The third prohibition, against disguised restrictions on international
trade, can be dealt with summarily. It is essentially a requirement that the measure be no more trade
73FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9 Subchapter Automatic Detention. (revised May 12,1998)
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9auto.html. (visited 2/26/02).
74GATT XX, October 13, 1947. http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/final e.htm (visited 2/26/02).
75United States { Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4, 1998 WTO DS LEXIS 13, *135
(1998).
17restrictive than necessary to achieve its desired end.76 If a measure is found to be \necessary" under Article
XX(b) or XX(d), it will also satisfy this portion of the chapeau. Thus, assuming the FDA import regime
falls within one of these exceptions, it will not be considered a \disguised restriction" on trade.
The discrimination provisions are more problematic for FDA. There are three elements of this part of the
chapeau. The measure must result in discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
and that discrimination must be either arbitrary or unjustiable.77 The FDA's import regime is clearly
discriminatory, as the Appellate Body has interpreted the phrase \discrimination between countries" to apply
not only to discrimination between dierent foreign countries, but also to discrimination between foreign
countries and the country imposing the measure.78 Whether that discrimination is between countries where
the same conditions prevail is a much harder question. Many of the states from which the United States
imports food, particularly those in the developing world, have a much lower level of basic sanitation than the
US. Others are susceptible to plant or animal pests or diseases that are not prevalent in the United States.
Nonetheless, the FDA treats all imports dierently from domestically produced food, not just those from
countries where conditions are dierent from the United States. It would be hard to characterize Canada,
the top exporter of food to the United States, as a country where dierent conditions prevail.
The question thus becomes whether FDA's discrimination is either arbitrary or unjustiable. The US
has a strong argument that the substantive aspect of the discrimination is neither arbitrary nor unjusti-
76United States { Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, AB 1996-1, 1996 WTO DS LEXIS 1, *53-4 (1996).
77The Appellate Body treats arbitrary discrimination and unjustiable discrimination as separate violations of the chapeau,
but does not oer any principled basis for distinguishing between the two. In the United States { Shrimp case cited above,
the AB found the US to unjustiably discriminate by virtue of its refusal to certify countries as \turtle-friendly" unless they
adopted exactly the same regulatory scheme as the US, and because the US pursued turtle-conservation agreements with
some countries, but not with others. The US was found to arbitrarily discriminate because the informal nature of its turtle
conservation certication process lacked adequate procedural safeguards. The AB fails to explain why the former discrimination
was \unjustiable" and the latter \arbitrary," or how one might apply the distinction between the two in other cases.
78United States { Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, AB 1996-1, 1996 WTO DS LEXIS 1, *53-4 (1996).
18able. Given the inability of the United States to supervise and control the conditions under which foreign
food is produced, allowing FDA to take action against imported food based on the mere appearance of
adulteration is a sensible response. The procedural aspect of the discrimination is more troublesome. In
the United States { Shrimp case, the Appellate Body found a US law prohibiting the import of shrimp
from countries unless the US State Department certied that their shrimping practices did not unduly en-
danger sea turtles to be in violation of the chapeau of Article XX. Among the problems the Appellate
Body had with the US measure was that the certication process lacked adequate procedural safeguards.
79TheFDAimportregimedoesnotsufferfrommanyofthedefectsoftheshrimpcertificationprocess:FDAdoesprovidenoticetoimporterswhoseproductsareeitherheldforsamplingorautomaticallydetained:TheimportersaregivenanopportunitytopresentevidencethattheirproductsarenotinviolationoftheFDCA:TheFDApromptlynotifiestheimporterofitsdecisionontheadmissibilityoftheproduct;andincaseswhereaproductisdeniedentryaftersamplingordetainedwithoutphysicalexamination;FDAregulationsrequirethattheimporterreceiveawrittenexplanationofthedenial:80
Other concerns expressed by the Appellate Body about the turtle certication regime do apply to the FDA
import regime, however. In particular, the Appellate body criticized the fact that no procedure existed for
review of or appeal from an adverse certication decision.81 This is also the case with an FDA decision to
deny a product entry. It is uncertain whether that alone would be enough to characterize FDA's behavior
as arbitrary. The Appellate Body has noted that \rigorous compliance with the fundamental requirements
of due process should be required in the application and administration of a measure which purports to be
an exception to the treaty obligations of the Member imposing the measure and which eectively results in
a suspension pro hac vice of the treaty rights of other Members."82 Given this strong language, the lack
of judicial review of FDA's import decisions could very well constitute a case of arbitrary or unjustiable
discrimination. Additionally, there does not seem to be any reason why more stringent procedural safeguards
79United States { Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4, 1998 WTO DS LEXIS 13, *178-
179 (1998).
80See generally FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9 Subchapter Detention and Hearing. (revised May 12,1998)
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9det.html (visited 2/26/02), FDA Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch.9
Subchapter Automatic Detention. (revised May 12,1998) http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance ref/rpm new2/ch9auto.html.
(visited 2/26/02). In contrast, the turtle certication process was completely informal, did not provide any opportunity to
be heard, and countries did not receive specic notication of whether their certication request was approved or denied. See
United States { Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4, 1998 WTO DS LEXIS 13, *177-178
(1998).
81United States { Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4, 1998 WTO DS LEXIS 13, *178
(1998).
82Id. At *179.
19would be inconsistent with the FDA's mission to ensure the safety of food imports. The US might argue
that because of FDA's scarce resources, the prospect of litigation over its decisions on imports would deter
it from using its power to deny potentially harmful products access to the US market. The Appellate Body
would most likely not be sympathetic to such an argument. Administrative inconvenience alone cannot
justify discrimination.83 Given the need of food producers, whether foreign or domestic, to establish coop-
erative working relationships with FDA, it seems unlikely that many FDA decisions on imports would be
appealed, particularly given the extreme solicitude granted the FDA in US Courts. Additionally, in the case
of automatic detention, a competent US authority has determined that the FDA is not only able to, but also
required to adhere to more stringent procedural safeguards.84 Thus it seems likely that under the GATT,
the laxer procedural standards applied by FDA to imported foods are in violation of Article III:4, and not
justied under Article XX.
C. The SPS Agreement
Even if the FDA food import regime is not in violation of GATT, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosan-
itary Measures imposes additional requirements with which FDA must comply. The SPS agreement applies
to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which are dened as:
Any measure applied:
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks
arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms
or disease-causing organisms;
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks
arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages
or feedstus;
83United States { Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, AB 1996-1, 1996 WTO DS LEXIS 1,*56-60.
84See supra n.44 and accompanying text.
20(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from
diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or
spread of pests; or
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry,
establishment or spread of pests.
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, require-
ments and procedures including, inter alia, end product criteria; processes and production
methods; testing, inspection, certication and approval procedures; quarantine treatments
including relevant requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with
the materials necessary for their survival during transport; provisions on relevant statistical
methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and packaging and labeling
requirements directly related to food safety.85
Measures that fall within the ambit of the SPS Agreement will also typically be the sorts of measures that
countries would try to justify under Article XX(b) of GATT. The SPS Agreement explicitly recognizes
this. Measures that satisfy the requirements of the SPS Agreement are thus presumed to fall within the
Article XX(b) exception.86 The requirements of the chapeau of Article XX are also incorporated by the
SPS Agreement.87 Thus the above analysis of the legality of the FDA import regime under the GATT is
equally valid under the SPS Agreement. The SPS Agreement, however, imposes additional requirements
beyond those of the GATT. In summary form, states are required to base sanitary measures on scientic
risk assessment principles. They are additionally encouraged to base domestic measures on international
standards, where such standards exist. Sanitary measures that are based on international standards are
presumptively in compliance with the Agreement. Deviations from international standards are permitted,
but states are required to justify such deviations with scientic evidence that the international standards
would not achieve the level of health protection that state feels is appropriate.88 These requirements have
generated substantial controversy, and potentially aect a great deal of what FDA does. For the purposes
of this essay, however, they are not particularly important, as they relate more to the substantive content
of FDA regulations than to the procedures by which FDA determines whether imported food complies with
86SPS Agreement 2:4.
87SPS Agreement 2:3.
88See Understanding the SPS Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/sps e/spsund e.htm (visited 2/26/02).
21those regulations.
The SPS Agreement does, however, explicitly address \control, approval, and inspection procedures," such
as the FDA import regime. Annex C of the agreement establishes a series of rules governing such procedures,
and Article 8 of the treaty makes compliance with those rules mandatory.89 Annex C provides, in relevant
part, that:
Members shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and ensure the fulllment of
sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that:
(a) such procedures are undertaken and completed without undue delay and in no less
favorable manner for imported products than for like domestic products... 90
The annex imposes a number of additional requirements as well, but there is no need to go beyond (a). The
FDA import regime clearly violates this requirement, as it is clear that imported products are treated much
less favorably than like domestic products. There is nothing in the language of the SPS Agreement that
would seem to permit an exception to this rule, and it is highly doubtful that a WTO panel or the Appellate
Body could be convinced to read an exception into the treaty against its plain language.
D. The TBT Agreement
The SPS Agreement is not the only specialized agreement that constrains FDA regulation of imported foods.
FDA's mission is not limited to the protection of public health; it also enforces laws whose primary aim is
consumer protection. The requirement of nutrition labelling, for example, is not directly related to food
safety, but rather is primarily intended to empower consumers to make informed choices about their diets.
Additionally, FDA enforcement of lth tolerance levels and food identity standards is primarily for the
89SPS Agreement 8.
22purpose of protecting consumers from economic, rather than physical harm. These sorts of FDA regulations
fall outside the ambit of the SPS Agreement, but will often be subject to the requirements imposed by the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The TBT Agreement applies to all \technical regulations," which
are dened as:
Document[s] which [lay] down product characteristics or their related processes and produc-
tion methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance
is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packag-
ing, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production
method.91
The TBT Agreement applies to both industrial and agricultural products, although it explicitly does not
apply to sanitary and phytosanitary regulations.92 FDA nutrition labelling requirements, lth tolerances,
and food identity standards are thus all technical regulations. The TBT Agreement imposes substantive
requirements on technical regulations, namely that they be non-discriminatory and as non-trade restrictive
as possible. For the purposes of this essay, however, the important provisions of the TBT Agreement are
those relating to conformity assessment procedures, which are all \procedures used, directly or indirectly, to
determine that relevant requirements in technical regulations or standards are fullled".93 These include,
all \procedures for sampling, testing and inspection; evaluation, verication and assurance of conformity;
registration, accreditation and approval as well as their combinations."94 Much like the SPS Agreement, the
TBT Agreement requirement explicitly requires states to use conformity assessment procedures that treat
imported products no less favorably than like domestic products.95 Clearly, FDA's import regime does not
comply with this requirement. It thus violates the TBT Agreement as well as the SPS Agreement.
92TBT Agreement 1.2, 1.5.
93TBT Agreement Annex A(3).
94Id.
95TBT Agreement 5.1.1.
23IV. Policy Recommendations and Conclusions
Although the FDA Import regime is clearly in violation of US obligations under the GATT, SPS Agreement,
and TBT Agreement, that is no reason for alarm. First of all, the mere fact that a violation exists does not
mean that a complaint will necessary be brought through the WTO dispute settlement process. Dispute
resolution through the WTO is costly, and claims typically are brought only in cases of clear violations
that harm discrete and powerful constituencies.96 While food exporters might be this sort of constituency
in many foreign countries, it would seem that they would have more to lose than they would to gain from
pressing their governments to initiate WTO dispute resolution. Under the current regime, the vast majority
of food imports are processed and enter the US without any FDA inspection, and as the statistics show,
FDA's discriminatory import regime has not prevented an explosion in the amount of food imported into the
US in the past ten years.97 Assuming that WTO dispute resolution could actually force a change in FDA's
policy, it is not clear that that change would actually favor foreign food exporters.98 Additionally, given
FDA's broad powers and discretion, and the solicitude that the agency is granted by US courts, foreign food
producers would likely think twice before pressing their governments to take action that would antagonize
FDA.
Even if dispute settlement proceedings are initiated under the WTO, and the end result is a judgment against
the US, that does not mean that the FDA would be forced to abandon its food import regime. Basically, an
adverse decision by a WTO Panel or the Appellate Body results in a request that the oending state bring
96David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five
Years. 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 865,9 18-19 (2000).
97See Part II, supra.
98For instance, FDA could impose the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) system uniformly on all
foreign and domestic food-processing plants. This system, which requires plants to follow specic procedures and keep detailed
records to facilitate FDA inspection, might be a more onerous burden on foreign food producers than the current system which
subjects 1-2% of imports to inspection. See Matthew Schaefer, Sovereignty Revisited: Food Safety Regulations { Cross-border
Implications { A US Perspective. 24 Can.-U.S. L.J. 377, 379 (1998).
24its measures into compliance with its WTO obligations. The WTO does not have any independent ability
to enforce this request, however. If the oending state does not voluntarily comply with the decision, the
aggrieved state may either seek alternative compensation from the violator, or seek authorization to punish
the oender by withdrawing trade concessions.99 As with compliance, compensation requires the cooperation
of the party found to be in violation. The withdrawal of trade concessions is typically only eective if the
withdrawing state actually has the ability to hurt the oending state by virtue of the withdrawal. In the
case of the United States, because of the vast size of its economy, only major economic powers such as the
European Union, Japan, and potentially the People's Republic of China can eectively use the withdrawal
of trade concessions as a means of enforcing compliance with WTO obligations.100 Even in the case of
such retaliation, a truly determined state can decide to maintain its measure if it feels that the benets of
doing so exceed the costs imposed by the withdrawal of trade concessions.101 Although it is generally in
the US interest to comply with adverse WTO rulings to preserve the legitimacy and integrity of a global
trading system from which no country benets more than the US, in this case the US should chose to pay
compensation or endure retaliation rather than weaken FDA's ability to regulate imports. The safety of the
American people is of paramount concern, and should not be sacriced in the name of free trade.
That is not to say that FDA's current regime is perfect, or that the Agency should not seek to improve it,
both in terms of its ability to assure the safety of imported foods, and in terms of its ability to expeditiously
process safe imported food. FDA should continue to work to modernize and streamline its procedures to
minimize the delay caused by its sampling and inspection activities. The computerized OASIS system was
99DSU Art. 22.
100This may change if developing states are successfully able to follow the precedent set by Ecuador in the EU { Bananas
case. Ecuador was the rst developing state to seek to use the withdrawal of concessions in the face of a refusal to comply with
an Appellate Body ruling. Ecuador sought to withdraw concessions under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Agreement (TRIPS), basically allowing it to retaliate against the EU's illegal quota system by refusing to recognize European
copyrights and patents. This tactic is potentially a potent trade weapon for smaller states. See Benjamin L. Brimeyer. Bananas,
Beef, and Compliance in the World Trade Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve
Compliance From Superpower Nations. 10 Minn. J. Global Trade 133, n.200. (2001).
101The EU, for example, has maintained its ban on the import of beef treated with hormones in the face of an adverse WTO
ruling and US retaliation costing EU exporters more than $120 million. See Brimeyer, supra n. 98 at 155-161.
25an important step in this direction, and eorts should be made to expand OASIS to cover all imported
foods. To the extent that its scarce resources permit, FDA should also try to expand its foreign inspection
activities, taking advantage of the provision in the SPS Agreement that requires states to cooperate in such
inspections.102
Ultimately, however, FDA's scarce resources, in combination with the vast numbers of imports it must
oversee, will require a dierent approach to the problem. FDA will need to rely increasingly on foreign
regulatory systems to ensure the safety of food that is exported to the United States. To that end, FDA
should work with appropriate foreign regulatory authorities to establish areas where foreign regulation can
be accepted as equivalent to US regulation. Clearly this will not be appropriate in many cases. The US has
one of the most stringent food safety schemes in the world, and many states, particularly in the developing
world, are simply not capable of ensuring a comparable level of safety given their existing sanitary and
regulatory infrastructure. Still, it seems likely that equivalence agreements could at least be worked out
with the EU, Canada, and Japan. More limited agreements, perhaps relating to specic categories of food
or food producers, could also be reached with other countries with which general equivalence agreements
would not be appropriate. The primary mission of FDA will of course remain the protection of American
consumers, so such agreements should only be reached when it is absolutely clear that the foreign regulatory
apparatus will ensure the same overall level of food safety as would FDA. Accepting the equivalence of
foreign regulations where appropriate will free up FDA resources, allowing the agency to devote more time
and energy to monitoring imports from more problematic countries. Additionally, the states with which the
US is likely to be able to reach equivalence agreements will tend to be its largest trading partners, and thus
the states most likely to bring WTO dispute settlement proceedings against the US. Reaching equivalence
agreements with those states will thus be likely to forestall any WTO action relating to FDA's import
102SPS 4.1.
26regime. Equivalence is not a panacea, however. It is potentially a useful way to ensure the safety of a large
percentage of US food imports while conserving FDA resources, but FDA will need to maintain its current
regime of essentially plenary regulatory authority over imports, both to deal with imports from states whose
food safety standards are not equivalent, and as a back-up to catch unsafe products that slip through the
cracks of equivalent foreign regulatory systems.
27